Healthcare Fraud in the Post-Pandemic Era: What the DOJ's 2026 Enforcement Numbers Reveal

The Department of Justice closed fiscal year 2025 with 843 healthcare fraud indictments — a 34% increase over the prior year and the highest total since the COVID-19 fraud task forces were stood up in 2021. The numbers for the first half of 2026 suggest the trend is accelerating. This Journal entry examines the data and draws out the implications for federal practitioners.

The enforcement landscape. Healthcare fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1347, carries a maximum of 20 years per count — or life if the fraud results in death. The statute is broad: it reaches any scheme to defraud a health care benefit program, including private insurers. In practice, the DOJ's Healthcare Fraud Unit concentrates on five categories: (1) telemedicine and DME kickback schemes, (2) opioid prescription mills, (3) genetic testing and lab fraud, (4) COVID-19 relief-related healthcare fraud, and (5) sober home and addiction treatment fraud. The first and third categories account for nearly 60% of all 2025 indictments.

Charging patterns. The typical healthcare fraud indictment charges a conspiracy count under 18 U.S.C. § 1349, multiple substantive § 1347 counts, and — in roughly 70% of cases — a money laundering count under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). The inclusion of money laundering is strategic: it dramatically expands the government's forfeiture reach and adds a potential 20-year consecutive sentence. Defense counsel confronting a healthcare fraud indictment should assume that the government has already traced the funds and prepared a money laundering fallback.

Sentencing data. The Sentencing Commission's 2025 data shows that the median sentence for healthcare fraud is 48 months, but the distribution is bimodal. Cases involving loss amounts under $3.5 million cluster in the 24-36 month range. Cases above $10 million in loss routinely produce sentences exceeding 96 months. The single most important variable — more than loss amount, more than number of patients affected — is whether the defendant is classified as an organizer or leader under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a). A four-level enhancement for leadership role adds, on average, 30 months to the Guidelines range.

The telemedicine factor. The DOJ's 2024 nationwide takedown — Operation Rubber Stamp — targeted telemedicine platforms that paid physicians to sign medically unnecessary orders for DME, genetic testing, and compounded medications. Over 200 defendants were charged across 17 districts. The common fact pattern: a marketing company generates patient leads, a telemedicine platform connects the leads to a physician who spends an average of 90 seconds per "consultation," and a DME supplier or pharmacy fills the order and bills Medicare. Every participant in the chain — marketer, platform operator, physician, and supplier — is exposed to conspiracy liability.

Practice pointers for the defense. First, loss amount is negotiable. The government's opening loss calculation almost always overstates actual loss by including billed amounts rather than paid amounts. Second, the telemedicine physician is often the government's cooperator — identify that witness early. Third, the safe harbor for legitimate marketing under the Anti-Kickback Statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(3), requires proof that the arrangement is commercially reasonable and at fair market value. A well-documented compliance file can be the difference between a declination and an indictment.