Courts Are Expected to Apply Supervised Release Policies, Not Create Them, 6th Circuit Says – Update for April 6, 2026

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6^th CIRCUIT SAYS NO TO ARBITRARY TIME ‘POLICIES’ ON SUPERVISED RELEASE TERMINATION

“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty told Alice in Through the Looking Glass, “it means just what I choose it to mean — neither more nor less.”

Under the supervised release statute – 18 USC § 3583 – a former prisoner on supervised release can apply to have his supervised release terminated after one year, no matter how long a period of supervised release he’s serving. Although the Sentencing Commission has said that district courts should favor early termination, there is an unfortunate history of district courts and probation officers adopting their own policies that hold the minimum time to be served on supervised release before early termination is what they say it is. No matter that § 3583(e) specifies early termination can be granted “after the expiration of one year of supervised release: to them, ‘one year’ may mean 18 months or two years or 50% or even – as one Probation Officer told me once –the judge she was working believed that everyone should serve their full supervised release term and not a day less.

The statute means what they choose it to mean. Humpty would be proud.

I have run into more than my share of probation officers and district judges who write their own blanket policies on when former prisoners can get off supervised release. It’s maddening that someone’s superlative history in prison and on supervised release means nothing stacked against their “policies.” And last week, the 6^th Circuit said as much.

Guy Collins was sentenced to 240 months in 2010 for a methamphetamine offense. After the First Step Act passed, Guy’s sentence was cut to 180 months, with his judge finding that Guy’s “post-sentencing rehabilitation has been extensive, as evidenced by his [prison programming] report and the letter appended to his motion.” Guy was 56 years old at the time and “ha[d] by all accounts turned his life around,” the Court said.

After his release, Guy began an 8-year supervised release term. After a year, Guy moved for early termination of supervised release under 18 USC § 3583(e)(1). The district court denied the first motion despite holding that further supervision appeared “unnecessary.” Nonetheless, the court denied the motion, holding that “the seriousness of [Guy’s] offense—trafficking crack cocaine — and his extensive criminal history,” argued against early termination, and “noted that Congress had mandated a minimum supervision term of eight years for defendants similarly situated” to Guy.

Sixteen months later, Guy tried again. The Court denied him again, applauding Guy’s good conduct but noting that he“has still not completed half of his term of supervision. As Defendant’s counsel is aware, the Court, as a matter of custom, will not consider a defendant’s request for early termination until he has completed at least half of his term of supervision.”

Guy appealed, but then filed a third motion for early termination, which he called a “renewed” motion. He asked the District Court to rule it would grant his renewed motion for early termination of supervised release if it had jurisdiction to do so, that is, if the denial of the prior one wasn’t on appeal. The District Court refused the motions but emphasized that its 50% custom “is precisely that—a custom, not an unbending rule—and the Court applies it with deference and adherence to the individualized inquiry that must accompany any analysis under § 3553(a)’s factors.”

The 6^th Circuit reversed the District Court’s denial of Guy’s motion, ruling that “district courts cannot employ a blanket rule requiring defendants to complete a certain proportion of their supervised-release term without conducting an individualized assessment of the relevant § 3553(a) factors,’ and that the district court therefore abused its discretion by failing to consider the relevant § 3553(a) factors in Guy’s case. The Circuit held that the District Court did ‘not explain how, if at all, the proportion of his supervised-release term that Guy has completed pertains to any relevant § 3553(a) consideration. Indeed, it gives no indication that the district court considered the relevant § 3553(a) sentencing factors.”

The 6^th held that the

amount of time a defendant has served cannot be the sole animating force behind a court’s early-termination decision—the statute mandates that such decisions flow from individualized inquiries based on the relevant § 3553(a) factors. A blanket rule, or custom, is not individualized. But assuming arguendo that the proportion completed can be considered for its bearing on some relevant § 3553(a) factor(s), a district court would need to be explicit in drawing that connection for a particular defendant: The proportion standing alone is not a relevant consideration… Congress imposed a minimum time requirement of one year, and a court may not add to that time requirement without tying its decision to the relevant statutory factors.

In its last order, the District Court concluded that “the need to adequately deter criminal conduct and protect the public from further crimes” counseled against giving Guy early termination. The Circuit rejected this makeweight: “[T]his finding… directly contradicts the court’s earlier statement in the First Order [that further supervised release was unnecessary]… The district court never explained why it changed its mind. Nor did it offer any other § 3553(a) factor to which the proportion of the term completed is relevant.”

United States v. Collins, Case No. 25-5395, 2026 U.S.App. LEXIS 9438 (6th Cir. April 1, 2026)

~ Thomas L. Root